Small-holder credit in Zimbabwe: Roles of farmers, government and the private sector. Report of field work conducted in Zimbabwe during October and November 1998 by Goodland, Andrew
I f. ~ . ~ ~. . .. . .:iil ro ·es o. · .arm;ers, gove·rnm:ettt .an·w 
• 
.. 
tbe: private sec-tor 
Report of field work conducted in Zimbabwe during 
October and November 1998 
Andrew Goodland 
February I 999 
•
Natural 
Resources 
Institute 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 
Summary 1 
Project Background 2 
The Zimbabwe Study 2 
The Cotton Sector in Zimbabwe 3 
Access to Credit for Cotton Smallholders 5 
Implications for other sectors 14 
Conclusions 19 
Annex I: Contact list 21 
Annex II: Terms of Reference 22 
Bibliography 23 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AFC 
CMB 
Cottco 
DANIDA 
IFAD 
GMB 
MFI 
NACSCUZ 
NGO 
NRI 
SED CO 
SHDF 
ZFU 
ZWFT 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Cotton Marketing Board 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
Danish International Development Agency 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
Grain Marketing Board 
Micro-finance institution 
National Association of Co-operative Savings and Credit Unions of 
Zimbabwe 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Natural Resources Institute 
Small Enterprises Development Corporation 
Self Help Development Foundation 
Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust 
i i 
SUMMARY 
Private sector cotton companies in Zimbabwe have taken initiatives to provide services to 
small-holder cotton farmers. By linking the provision of credit, input supply and 
extension advice to the marketing of seed cotton, the companies have contributed 
significantly to the recent increase in small-holder cotton production. Their approaches 
provide lessons for other small-holder crop sectors and demonstrate the potential for 
private sector involvement in the provision of agricultural services. 
The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco) has become the largest lender to small-
holders in Zimbabwe, both in terms of total amount lent per annum and the number of 
borrowers. Repayment rates had reached 98 percent by 1998. It has achieved this by 
developing a sophisticated lending methodology since the inception of the input credit 
scheme in 1993. This approach includes: group liability for loans; developing close 
relationships between the company and the small-holders; providing extension advice in 
addition to the input credit; and, giving cash incentives for good repayment performance. 
The scheme has been a success despite the competitive market for seed cotton, with two 
new entrants in the market vying for small-holder seed cotton. Despite some early 
problems with competing companies, which were able to offer better terms for 
purchasing seed cotton, the Cottco scheme has survived, partly due to strict treatment of 
defaulters. Meanwhile, one of the competing companies, Cotpro, has initiated a similar 
input credit scheme. 
The experiences in the cotton sector highlight the need to improve smallholder access to 
inputs to increase productivity. Providing credit is only part of the solution, and in fact 
many smallholders can afford to purchase inputs without credit. Local availability of 
inputs is equally important. The cotton companies and some of the input suppliers are 
seeking to extend the availability of inputs in rural areas. In addition, CARE operate a 
credit scheme for local input suppliers. 
There is wide awareness of input credit schemes in Zimbabwe and there have been 
several experiences outside the cotton sector, including maize and groundnuts, and 
outgrower schemes for high-value horticultural products. Experiences have been mixed. 
The chances of success are enhanced when a number of key conditions are met: 
• low fungibility of credit (such that credit cannot easily be used for a different purpose 
-providing credit in-kind helps reduce fungibility) 
• few opportunities to divert the output from the creditor (a condition which is 
particularly pertinent for food crops, which can be consumed or marketed locally) 
• mechanisms are in place to enforce repayment, and 
• the private sector has the means and incentive to operate a credit scheme. 
PROJECT BACKGROUND. 
The agricultural supply response to market liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
extremely variable, but often disappointing- particularly for food crops. For some crops 
and regions, it seems that policy-makers over-estimated commercial willingness to 
become involved in the marketing of small-holder production. Perceived risk, poor 
information, and high transaction costs have contributed to an often weak commercial 
presence in the more marginal or remote areas. Yet the parastatals that formerly provided 
output and input marketing services, sometimes with a credit component, have been 
largely dismantled. For many small-holders, this leaves a critical gap in the provision of 
agricultural marketing and associated rural services. 
Smallholder access to agricultural services (financial services, inputs, extension, output 
marketing) is recognised as a critical constraint to agricultural development in sub-
Saharan Africa. State withdrawal puts the onus on the commercial sector to provide 
these services. In wishing to facilitate a greater commercial role in the provision of rural 
services, development agencies are particularly interested in partnership approaches, 
which build on the competences of commercial, non-governmental and public players. 
The research reported here was conducted as part of project whose purpose is to examine 
credit delivery models, where the commercial sector has been willing to provide credit to 
small-holders for production inputs. Such schemes usually link credit repayment to crop 
purchase. The initial research comprised a review of credit delivery schemes in the cotton 
sectors ofUganda and Zimbabwe, where private sector companies have taken the lead in 
providing credit to cotton small-holders. The intention is to identify key conditions for 
success, such that the models (or an adaptation) may be applied to other crops or 
situations. Stakeholder workshops are to be held in both countries in early 1999, to 
review the research results, and identify additional applications and priorities for further 
work on input supply and credit. 
THE ZIMBABWE STUDY 
This report documents the findings of desk research and fieldwork conducted in 
Zimbabwe. The purpose ofthe author's three week visit during October/November 1998 
was to review the current situation in the cotton sector, documenting the recent history in 
the provision of credit to smallholders. This required a brief overview of the cotton sector 
in Zimbabwe, and an understanding of rural finance, in particular of small-holder access 
to credit. The initiatives taken by the private cotton companies provide a vital source of 
credit and other services for small-scale cotton growers 1. The NRl research has permitted 
the identification ofkey issues relating to their operation and sustainability. These 
lessons may shed some light on appropriate and/or necessary conditions for private sector 
involvement in the provision of credit to smallholders. Full Terms of Reference are 
attached at Annex 11. 
1 The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe is principally divided between large-scale commercial farmers, and 
small-scale communal farmers (who largely farm the former tribal lands). 
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THE COTTON SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE 
Production: 
Cotton production has a long history in Zimbabwe, dating back to the beginning of the 
century. It has traditionally been a crop grown by large-scale commercial farmers, though 
since Independence in 1980 there has been a marked shift towards small-holder farms. In . 
1979/80, out of a total area of90,000 hectares under cotton, only 15,000 (17%) was 
farmed by the communal sector. By 1996/97, 267,000 out of a total of 313,000 hectares 
of cotton was cultivated by smallholders- 85% of the total acreage (The Agricultural 
Sector of Zimbabwe Statistical Bulletin 1998). In 1992, it was estimated that 100,000 
smallholders were growing cotton. (Kennedy and Hone, quoted in Gordon 1997). 
Currently, some 200,000 smallholders are estimated to grow cotton, although there are no 
reliable statistics on this (Chakayuka, Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, personal 
communication)2• 
During the 1990s the shift away from large-scale commercial production of cotton has 
become even more marked, halving between 1990 and 1998. The decrease in commercial 
production is associated with a corresponding decrease in overall average yields. Yields 
achieved by commercial farmers are much higher than those in the communal sector. In 
1996/7, communal farmer seed cotton yields averaged 740 kg/ha, whilst commercial 
sector yields were 1,756 kg/ha. However, yields vary considerably in both sectors, and it 
is not unheard of for smallholders to achieve yields in excess of 2000 kg/ha (Chakayaku, 
pers. comm.). The differences between yields can be partly accounted for by the use of 
different production techniques: large-scale commercial farmers use irrigated lands and 
have high levels of purchased inputs. Interestingly, both smallholder and commercial 
farmer yields have remained more or less constant for the past twenty years, despite the 
introduction ofhigher-yielding varieties, though there is evidence that soils have been 
exhausted through over-cropping. 
Typically, smallholders grow cotton in conjunction with maize, the main food crop, 
though not necessarily in rotation. Cotton is considered the main source of income for the 
majority of smallholders growing the crop (87% of smallholders identified cotton as their 
major income source in the survey ofMudhara, 1995). The increase in smallholder 
cultivation of cotton over the past decade is due partly to the perception of cotton as a 
drought tolerant crop, which makes it favourable to rain-fed producers (only a small 
proportion of smallholders have access to irrigation). Even the lower returns to cotton 
production in recent years due to a drop in the world market price have not apparently 
dissuaded smallholders from cotton production, though this has contributed to 
commercial farmers seeking alternative land uses3. Communal farmers have fewer 
options due to their limited access to inputs and irrigated land. They have continued to 
plant cotton, actually increasing the total area under cotton. 
2 The Zimbabwe Farmers Union estimates that up to 300,000 smallholders may be producing cotton. 
3 Commercial farmers have re-invested cotton profits in more lucrative production, such as high value 
horticulture. Large-scale cotton producers face higher labour costs than communal farmers- and this has 
also contributed to the commercial sector's shift away from cotton. 
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Cotton production in Zimbabwe is associated with relatively high use of physical inputs 
(compared with Uganda, for instance, where fertiliser is rarely used in cotton production). 
Planting seed is supplied by the Seed Division of the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, 
which has exclusive rights to the development and multiplication of cottonseed -though 
varietal decisions are taken annually by a committee with wider representation. Fertiliser 
use is common even amongst smallholders. A basal fertiliser is applied at planting and 
also possibly after germination, whilst top-dressing fertilisers (typically ammonium 
nitrate or urea) are applied at the flowering stage. In addition, pesticides are applied 
during the growing season. Access to purchased inputs is therefore critical for 
smallholders. There is evidence that credit for inputs is important for smallholder 
production of cotton. Another 1995 survey found that 77.7% of smallholders use credit 
for cotton production (Mudhara et al, 1995), and farmer interviews conducted in 1997 om 
Gokwe North (Gordon, 1997) indicated that planted areas was dependent on credit for 
inputs. 
As well as requiring purchased physical inputs, cotton cultivation is also labour-intensive. 
Weeding must be carried out when necessary, which could be up to four times per 
season. Weeding in the smallholder sector is done by hand, normally by women. In 
addition, the crop is hand-picked. 
Institutional development in the cotton sector. 
Prior to 1994, the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) had a monopoly on the purchase of 
seed cotton. However, the cotton sector has been liberalised. The CMB has been 
privatised (although the Government has retained a 25% shareholding) and has become 
the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (subsequently referred to as "Cottco"). In 1994, 
cotton purchase was liberalised and anyone is now allowed to purchase seed cotton. 
Currently there are three cotton processors: Cottco, Cotpro, and Cargill. Their total 
ginning capacity in 1998 is estimated to be around 400,000 tonnes of seed cotton. It is 
presently under-utilised: the production of seed cotton in 1997/8 was estimated at 
275,000 tonnes. 
The cotton companies have taken an active role in supplying services to small holders 
(see below). The reasons for this can be attributed to: 
1. The increased share of production by smallholders has meant that all three cotton 
companies are dependent to some extent on securing a supply of seed cotton from 
these producers. They have therefore sought means to increase the supply from 
smallholders by providing production services (input supply, credit and extension). 
2. Excess ginning capacity within the country has heightened competition between 
cotton companies, which have sought means of securing access to seed cotton. One 
way of achieving this is to link the marketing of seed cotton to the provision of 
production services. 
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3. The general paucity of agricultural services available to small-holders from other 
sources, especially those in remoter areas, has left cotton companies with little option 
than to become involved in production credit and input supply. 
ACCESS TO CREDIT FOR COTTON SMALLHOLDERS 
Financial services available in rural areas 
Commercial banking sector 
The commercial banking sector in Zimbabwe provides few financial services to 
smallholders. Some savings facilities are available, but little or no credit. The reasons for 
are as follows: 
• banks have few branches in rural areas, making the screening and monitoring of 
smallholders difficult and expensive, which increases the risk of default 
• rain-fed agriculture is perceived as an inherently risky activity, and the possibility of 
crop failure and loan default is high 
• transaction costs of dealing with small-holders are high due to the small loan size 
required and high administrative costs 
• small-holders have little to offer in way of collateral - for instance communal and 
resettlement lands have no titles 
• small-holders generally do not have business plans, which are a requirement for most 
commercial bank lending operations - the banks are used to doing business with 
large- scale commercial farmers, and have similar requirements and expectations of 
small-holders. 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Since Independence in 1980, the most important formal source of credit for communal 
farmers has been the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). The AFC received loans 
from Government at below market rates and on-lent to small-holders for short-term 
seasonal working capital, medium-term loans for machinery, and long-term credit for 
farm purchase. Interest rates for small-holder loans were therefore subsidised and below 
prevailing market rates. The programme expanded during the 1980s and peaked in 1986 
when over 95,000 smallholders received loans. The AFC is not legally permitted to take 
savings and is therefore wholly dependent upon external financing. With the Government 
guaranteeing the loans, the incentives for recovering loans were dampened, and 
repayment rates were generally low. The expansion of the scheme led to an increasing 
administrative burden. To improve repayment rates, a 'stop-order' system was operated, 
whereby the repayment of loans was deducted when farmers delivered produce to 
parastatal marketing boards, which at the time had marketing monopolies. 
However, repayment remained low as farmers took out loans in different names and 
marketed their produce through friends and family, thereby avoiding repayment. In 1989, 
in an effort to combat high administrative costs and low repayment rates, group lending 
was introduced with groups taking joint liability for loans. However, inexperience in 
group formation and group lending methodologies, coupled with the perception among 
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small-holders that AFC loans were government money and therefore 'free', led to default 
rates for groups which were even higher than those of individual borrowers. 
During the 1990s, pressures have increased on AFC. The severe drought in 1992led to 
mass default. Furthermore, since 1994 the government guarantees have not materialised 
as public spending has been squeezed, despite pledges made by Government to continue 
to guarantee AFC loans. 
The high default rate and cash flow constraints have forced AFC to become far more 
disciplined in their approach to small-holder lending. Nobody in arrears is eligible for 
further credit, and much greater efforts are being made to recover loans, for instance by 
seizing the assets of defaulters. Consequently, since the late 1980s there has been a steady 
reduction in the number of AFC clients and in the amount loaned. Loans are still 
provided both to groups and to individuals. The AFC now has a much smaller clientele, 
though more reliable. AFC is still able to offer lower interest rates than are available from 
commercial sources, due to concessional financing from a number of sources, including 
IF AD and DANIDA. 
AFC has aspirations to becoming an agricultural development bank, and the license for 
this was expected to be issued before the end of 1998. This will enable AFC to mobilise 
savings. With their extensive network in rural areas, the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe, 
as it will be known, will be well placed to provide financial services to the agricultural 
sector. Seven branches nationwide are supported by approximately 25 district offices. In 
addition, 55 small bank offices are planned in remoter rural areas. 
Other sources of financial services 
In addition to the AFC, there are a number of other institutions which have an 
involvement in providing rural financial services. 
Post Office Savings Bank 
The post office has a wide network of branches, numbering around 500, scattered across 
the country. Savings facilities are offered through the post office, though are not available 
from all branches. No credit facilities are available. 
Small Entetprises Development Cotporation CSEDCO) 
SEDCO is a publicly owned corporation (though there are plans to privatise it). SEDCO 
offers loans for micro-enterprises, medium scale commercial entreprise and industrial 
enterprises, the majority of which are in rural areas. It does not cater for small-holders. 
Self Help Development Foundation CSHDF) 
This is an NGO involved in establishing savings clubs. In 1998 there were around 12,000 
savings clubs nationwide, with 10,000 affiliated to SHDF. 93% oftotal membership are 
women, and 80% reside in rural areas (Rukovo et al, 1998). The SHDP has a credit 
programme for savings clubs with a good history. However, the credit programme is 
small: only 389loans worth Z$402,000 were disbursed from June 1995- June 1997. 
Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust CZWFT) 
This is an NGO encouraging savings and providing credit to women. ZWFT operates a 
group based lending system. The majority of enterprises financed by ZWFT are petty 
traders - crop production accounts for only 2% of the enterprises. 
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National Association of Co-operative Savings and Credit Unions of Zimbabwe 
(NACSCUZ) 
NACSCUZ is an umbrella organisation of savings and credit co-operatives which are 
registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. NACSCUZ provides training and audit 
services. The Act allows the co-operatives to mobilise savings from members and lend to 
members. To date, ten of the Savings and Credit Cooperatives have established village 
banks. 
Private non-financial sector provision of credit in the cotton sector 
The main focus of this study is to explore the approaches taken by the cotton companies 
in providing input credit to smallholders. The challenges of providing credit to 
smallholders are multiple: 
1. screening potential borrowers to assess their creditworthiness and likelihood for 
repayment 
2. providing credit in the right form and at the right time 
3. monitoring to ensure that the credit is used productively 
4. ensuring repayment of the loan 
Although all of these factors are important for a successful credit scheme, experience 
shows that the most critical aspect is to ensure the repayment of the loan. In a competitive 
market, this requires that the potential problem of 'strategic default' is addressed. 
'Strategic default' occurs when a borrower defaults on a loan intentionally. This may 
occur when the borrower believes that default will not jeopardise future income or access 
to credit. Strategic default can occur where there are multiple buyers and 'side-
marketing' is possible. 'Side-marketing' refers to farmers taking credit from one buyer 
but avoiding repayment by selling to another. For example, prior to the full liberalisation 
of seed cotton marketing, this was not a problem as the CMB was the only buyer in the 
market. However, with three cotton companies now competing in the market, and farmers 
able to sell directly to the cotton companies or marketing middlemen, the problem of 
side-marketing has emerged. Currently, two of the three cotton companies are operating 
credit schemes. The experiences of all three companies are described below. 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco) is the largest company in the cotton sector, 
accounting for around 70% of seed cotton purchases and processing. Cottco was formed 
from the privatisation of the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) in 1994. The company was 
quoted on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in 1997. 
The Cottco input credit scheme started in 1992/1993 season, before the sector was 
liberalised. During 1991 and 1992, Zimbabwe experienced severe drought, and the 
Government, with donor assistance, was seeking ways to promote the recovery of the 
agricultural sector. The CMB, as it was then, approached the Government with a scheme 
to establish a revolving fund to finance an input credit scheme in which farmers could 
receive seed, fertiliser and pesticides on credit, the repayment being made at the point of 
sale of seed cotton. Support came from the World Bank, which provided a loan through 
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Government, which was released over a number of years. By 1996, over Z$90 million 
had been loaned for the input credit scheme, together with additional loans to support the 
industry. 
At the outset of the scheme, small-scale farmers were asked to form groups of cotton 
growers (minimum size 50). The rationale behind forming groups was twofold. Firstly, it 
facilitated the dissemination of information, including extension advice. Secondly, and 
most importantly, it created joint liability for the input credit. With all members of a 
group standing to lose out if one member defaulted, there is a strong incentive for peer 
policing. Since the scheme was initiated, it has been found that groups of 50 or more are 
too large to manage. Group leaders were encouraging unworthy farmers to join groups in 
order to make up the numbers, and this was proving costly with high default rates. By 
1998, therefore, the required size of groups had been reduced to a minimum of 5 and 
maximum of 25 members. 
Once groups had been formed and a chairman selected, groups approached CMB/Cottco 
to register. Registration takes place after an assessment of the group has been made. 
A database is kept of all cotton growers. This was established prior to liberalisation, and 
is now used by Cottco to screen communal farmers who wish to participate in the input 
credit scheme. This assessment is based on records which are kept on individual farmers, 
noting the quantity of cotton produced in each year. If the records showed that farmers 
were reliable producers, a credit limit for each individual within the group was calculated 
based on 60% of their average production of the previous three years, multiplied by the 
producer price of the previous season. In practice, the system has some flexibility- for 
instance a farmer without previous experience of cotton growing can be included in the 
scheme if the other members of the group are willing to support the new member. 
Cottonseed comes from the Seed Division of Cottco, and chemicals are purchased by 
Cottco in bulk from local companies. Distribution and administration costs are added to 
this to reach a price for the inputs. Inputs are provided in three tranches during the 
growing season. The first tranche consists of seed and basal fertiliser. When cotton 
planting is completed, Cottco, with assistance from both Agritex (the extension service) 
and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) monitor the progress of the crop. Then, 
depending upon advice from these crop specialists, the second tranche is released. The 
second tranche includes pesticides, and if necessary, top-dressing fertiliser. If the 
estimated harvest is poor, due to weather conditions, the quantities and timing of tranche 
dispersal will be changed to maximise output whilst minimising risk. The third tranche 
consists oftop-dressing fertiliser. 
These inputs are distributed from depots around the country. Typically, a group leader 
will collect the inputs from the depot, hiring transportation if necessary. It is the 
responsibility of the group leader to ensure that the members of the group receive their 
input entitlement. The group leaders have an important role to play in the functioning of 
the scheme. They are the main contact point between the company and the farmers. They 
are rewarded for their work by incentives for good performance. Group repayment of 
above 95% is rewarded by bonuses (up to 3% ofthe value ofthe loan if 100% is 
8 
achieved). This is paid to the group leaders, who distribute it amongst the members at 
their discretion. 
All cotton produced by smallholders must be sold to Cottco (i.e. not just enough to cover 
the repayment of the input credit). Although this is difficult to control, small-holders who 
engage in side-marketing will be penalised in the following season, as their credit limit 
will be determined by the amount of seed cotton sold to Cottco. Again, monitoring by the 
local Cottco agents and the group leaders will minimise side-marketing. 
When the scheme was started, there was little difficulty in recovering the loan as Cottco 
was the sole buyer in the market. However, the introduction of competition threatened 
the viability of the scheme, as strategic default through side-marketing became an option 
for smallholders. To combat this several steps were taken to ensure repayment: 
• in the event of default, assets (for instance cattle) can be seized from defaulters by a 
sub-contracted debt collector 
• further loan dispersals to the group are halted (though in practice if the group 
achieves a 95% repayment rate it can continue in the scheme, with the outstanding 
debt rolled over to the following season4) 
• monetary incentives are offered to groups with a 95% or better repayment rate. 
These tactics appear to be working, with repayment of 96% in the 97/98 season. 
The rapid expansion of the scheme during its early years (from 1992/93- 1994/95) 
brought with it problems of effective management, and led to an increasing default rate. 
This was compounded by the entry of competitors into the market which were able to 
purchase seed cotton from farmers participating in the input credit scheme. 
The scheme peaked in numbers in 1995/6 season when 86,426 farmers took input credits. 
For the coming season (1998/99), 48,000 smallholders will participate in the credit 
scheme, and approximately Z$120 million will be advanced to them. (It is worth noting 
that Cottco also runs a credit input scheme for large-scale commercial farmers, who 
benefit from the lower interest rates than exist in the commercial banking sector. The 
large-scale farmers make more use of purchased inputs, and this is reflected in this year's 
forecast that a further Z$120 will be advanced to only 200 large-scale commercial 
farmers. The inputs provided for the smallholders are used much more productively than 
those used by commercial farmers. Approximately 70% of seed cotton is expected to 
come from the smallholder sector in the 1998/1999 season). 
In addition to those small-holders on the input credit scheme, many other small-holders 
purchase inputs from Cottco. All farmers benefit from technical advice, for instance a 
4 Cottco have a policy of never writing off debt, even if the crop fails completely. In such an instance the 
debt will be rolled over, or special provisions made for the repayment of the loan in coming seasons. 
9 
weekly radio broadcast for cotton growers. The scheme is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated. In an expansion of the scheme, Cottco has recently introduced individual 
cash loans to farmers with a good history who are achieving high production levels: those 
producing at least 20 bales of seed cotton. Furthermore, the Cottco scheme is insured. 
The risks covered are: death; permanent disability; sickness; and general default. Every 
participant in the scheme is automatically covered as soon as he/she draws inputs from 
the scheme. 
To operate the input credit scheme, Cottco employs 26 loan officers. Loan officers are 
encouraged to maximise the amount oftime that they spend in the field. Farmer contact is 
considered crucial for maintaining good relations between the company and the farmers, 
and to be able to respond to specific needs of farmer groups. 
Although the Cottco experience has been largely positive, it is a subsidised credit 
scheme, and dependent upon soft loans from the World Bank. Without access to these 
funds, the scheme would have to charge significantly higher rates to remain self-
financing. 
CotproLtd 
Cotpro entered the cotton market in Zimbabwe in 1995, initially in the south east ofthe 
country, a relatively isolated cotton production area. Cotpro's initial clients were large-
scale commercial farmers. From 1996, small-scale communal farmers were brought into 
the scheme as Cotpro moved into the Chinhoyi district. Small cotton markets have been 
established in rural areas not serviced by Cottco. The scheme operated by Cotpro is 
similar to Cottco's in many respects, though it operates on a much smaller scale. 
In 1998, Cotpro have 40 cotton 'markets', which both distribute inputs and receive seed 
cotton from smallholders. Roughly 2500 farmers are organised into 180 groups. Both 
cash and physical inputs are provided on credit. To implement the scheme, Cotpro 
employ a number of local agents who work closely with group leaders to screen and 
monitor group members. The system is heavily dependent on local information. Care has 
been taken to employ local staff who have good knowledge oflocal communities. As 
with the Cottco scheme, inputs are provided in a number oftranches. 
The two main threats to the scheme are considered to be the risk of crop failure and the 
potential for side-marketing. To overcome side-~arketing, a system of incentives has 
been established: agents and group leaders receive bonuses if groups achieve a 95% or 
better recovery rate. 
The scheme is financed partly from the company's own resources, and partly from a 
special facility from the Development Section of AFC, and from commercial banks. In 
order to provide a competitive service, the interest rates are cross-subsidised from other 
operations of the company. The effective rate is approximately 29-30%, compared with 
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approximately 25-26% from Cottco5. Cash credits are mainly reserved for larger scale 
fanners. 
A new 'state of the art' ginnery is being constructed in Chinhoyi, which will have a 
ginning capacity of 40,000 tonnes of seed cotton, a high proportion of which is planned 
to be supplied from the smallholder sector. 
Cotpro would appreciate the opportunity to share information concerning farmers' 
creditworthiness with other cotton companies, but as yet no progress has been made with 
this, despite approaches to Cottco. (Cottco presumably has much better information than 
the other companies- with its long-established records and database). It is possible that 
some of the farmers on the Cotpro scheme are previous defaulters from Cottco, and 
therefore excluded from the Cottco scheme. These farmers would potentially be a risk for 
Cotpro, which would benefit from having information on their creditworthiness. Having 
said this, the repayment rate of Cotpro is very high. 
Cotpro ambitions for the input credit scheme are fairly modest. It is aiming to have a 
maximum of 8000 farmers - conscious that the larger the scheme, the greater the 
difficulty of monitoring smallholders, and risk of failture. 
Cargill Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd 
Cargill entered the cotton market in Zimbabwe in 1995. It does not operate a credit 
scheme and has no intention of doing so. This is due in part to the extra burden and 
administration of operating an input credit scheme. In addition, there is resistance within 
the company to operating credit schemes when volatile economic conditions exist, such 
as in Zimbabwe, where as of October 1998, annual inflation was running at 34% and the 
cost of capital was approximately 40%. Cargill argue that the interest rate it would have 
to charge to make an input credit scheme viable would be so high as to dissuade 
smallholders, and potentially cause longer term indebtedness. 
Cargill is dependent upon the small-holder sector for around 75% of its seed cotton 
purchases. It has in the past bought from cotton farmers within the Cottco input credit 
scheme. It has done this not by offering higher prices but by paying fanners on the same 
day as the seed cotton is delivered. In the 1998 buying season Cottco also began to 
provide smallholders with spot payments, thereby lessening the possibility of Cargill 
purchasing from these fanners. 
As an alternative to credit, Cargill has started a programme whereby farmers are given 
the option of purchasing inputs (fertiliser and pesticide) when they sell their crop. As 
inflation is so high, farmers stand to benefit significantly from purchasing inputs and 
storing them for six months. Farmers taking this option are under no obligation to sell 
their next season's seed cotton to Cargill. Cargill are confident, that given a level playing 
5 It is difficult to estimate a precise interest rate for the Cotpro and Cottco input credit schemes. Both 
charge a flat rate, irrespective of how long the loan is taken out for. For example, a farmer receiving inputs 
in October and repaying in April, will repay the same amount as a farmer receiving inputs in October and 
repaying in August- the interest rate is therefore lower for the latter. 
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field, that they can offer higher prices than their competitors due to lower ginning costs. 
Plans have been made to expand this system by bringing in local agricultural input 
dealers. 
Role of Agritex in cotton input credit schemes 
Agritex has an important role to play in the cotton input credit schemes. Working 
alongside the agents of the cotton companies, they provide extension advice which 
increases the productivity ofthe inputs. It also helps to alert the cotton companies as to 
the state of the crop and pesticide/fertilizer requirements. 
Agritex has close ties with all three cotton companies. Information has been provided by 
all three companies on the services that they are offering to smallholders, so that Agritex 
field officers are able to provide advice on the different input schemes. 
Agritex has a much higher presence in the cotton growing districts than do any of the 
cotton companies. The Commercial Cotton Growers Association finances Agritex field 
officers to train at the Cotton Training Centre. 
Cotton farmers' perceptions 
Cotton farmers from Bindura district, approximately lOOkm north east ofHarare, were 
interviewed to draw out their experiences of the credit schemes. The interviewees 
included a Cottco group leader, Cottco group members, and farmers growing cotton but 
not on an input credit scheme. 
• Farmers showed a general reluctance to take credit from any source. Some ofthose 
farmers not on the scheme had little interest in taking credit from a cotton company. 
The reason for this was a fear of being indebted. This demonstrates that farmers are 
aware that loans must be repaid: a significant advance from the AFC experiences of 
the late 1980s which blames its high default rate on 'financial indiscipline.' 
• Approximately half of the farmers interviewed did not have any need for credit and 
were able to finance the purchase of inputs from their own resources. These farmers 
however were benefiting from the availability of inputs from Cottco. This suggests 
that credit is not a universal constraint to smallholders in the cotton sector. The 
physical availability of inputs is also an important element in increasing access to 
purchased inputs. 
• One farmer who had grown cotton regularly and achieved good yields, said he was 
excluded from joining a group, due to personal difficulties with the group leader in 
his community. This raises a possible disadvantage of the group approach, as reliable 
cotton growers may be excluded from joining the input scheme due to non-economic 
factors. 
• All the cotton farmers interviewed claimed to market their cotton exclusively to 
Cottco, although some had been approached by Cargill, who offered a slightly better 
price. Loyalty to Cottco was expressed, and there appeared to be a close working 
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relationship between Cottco and the farmers (although the interviewee responses may 
have been influenced by the presence of Cottco staff). Farmers were apparently 
suspicious of Cargill, and did not wish to jeopardise their relationship with Cottco. 
• There was a lack of understanding of the finer points of the input scheme. For 
instance, none ofthe farmers interviewed were aware ofthe cost of the credit, which 
casts some doubt on the concerns of Cottco and Cotpro to compete over interest rates. 
• There was general satisfaction with the scheme operated by Cottco and several 
farmers expressed an interest in expanding their cotton production. 
Conclusions from input credit schemes in the cotton sector 
1. The principal concern of the cotton companies is to secure sufficient throughput for 
their ginneries, and all three companies are significantly dependent upon the 
smallholder sector. Cottco and Cotpro have launched input credit schemes to ensure 
access to smallholder seed cotton. 
2. The credit schemes of both Cotpro and Cottco appear to be successful in terms of 
repayment and both companies have been able to secure a significant proportion of 
their seed cotton requirements through their input credit schemes. 
3. The total number of smallholders currently benefiting from the schemes numbers 
approximately 55,000. This shows that there is considerable potential for farmers to 
grow cotton even without credit- and it appears that many farmers use their own 
resources to purchase inputs. This also supports Cargill's view that provision of credit 
is not essential to assure supplies of seed cotton from smallholders. 
4. The potential problem of side marketing has been addressed through a combination of 
strategies. 
• Screening of potential borrowers is performed by the group members who realise 
that they stand to lose if an unreliable farmer joins their group. In addition, both 
Cotpro and Cottco employ local agents who have local knowledge and therefore 
are in a position to assess the credentials of loan applicants. 
• Close monitoring of the farmers throughout the season and links with Agritex 
ensure that the smallholders are putting the inputs to good use, thereby increasing 
the chances of loan repayment. 
• Tying in extension services with the input credit schemes serves both to increase 
the productivity of those inputs, and also helps to create a closer relationship 
between the company and the smallholder, and loyalty of smallholders to the 
particular company supplying credit. 
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• In the event of default, Cottco has come down hard on defaulters, seizing assets to 
ensure recovery of loans. 
• Generally, a combination of instilling financial discipline and weeding out 
potential defaulters has created a reliable clientele. 
5. Neither Cottco nor Cotpro charge market interest rates in their programmes. This 
casts doubt over the long term sustainability of the schemes. 
6. The group mechanism has been put to maximum effect. There are several advantages: 
• group screening of applicants; 
• economies of scale in input and output marketing; 
• facilitation of monitoring; 
• joint liability for loan recovery; and 
• facilitating extension provision and coverage. 
7. Incentives are used to encourage good performance of cotton producer groups. 
8. All three companies have taken steps to make inputs available to smallholders, 
whether provided on credit or made available for cash purchase. The companies buy 
inputs in bulk and can therefore supply inputs at a discounted rate. 
Future of the schemes: 
The schemes have been operating during a period of relatively good production 
conditions, and therefore the companies involved have not had to confront the problem of 
mass default from severe crop failure (as there was in the 1991/92 season). Severe 
droughts are a fairly regular occurrence in Zimbabwe and so it would seem that it is only 
a matter oftime before this problem will need to be addressed. Rolling the debt over to 
the following year is one possible response, though this would require the companies to 
find additional funds. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER SECTORS 
Key conditions 
The experiences of the cotton sector have implications for the operation of such schemes 
in other sectors in Zimbabwe. The corresponding field work conducted in Uganda led to 
the identification of key conditions which are either essential or desirable for the 
operation of private non-financial sector credit schemes (Goodland, 1998). These are: 
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1. low degree of transferability of credit - if the credit can be used for a different 
purpose (for instance, cash is highly fungible), there is a chance that it will be put to 
non-productive use, increasing the risk of default; 
2. lack of alternative uses for output -when the output can be disposed of in a number of 
ways (for example, household consumption, local marketing or household 
processing), the lower the likelihood that it will used to repay the loan; 
3. mechanisms to ensure the recovery of credit; and 
4. private sector has incentive and means to provide credit. 
The cotton sector input schemes described above demonstrate all these four conditions. 
Providing credit in the form of physical inputs (seed, fertiliser and pesticides) reduces the 
chance of it being put to other uses (though there is a chance that both the fertiliser and 
pesticide are applied to other crops). Seed cotton cannot be processed at the household 
level, nor is it edible (without industrial processing), so it is oflittle value to anyone other 
than ginneries. A number of innovative mechanisms are in place to ensure repayment (for 
example group liabilities, close monitoring, and cash incentives). Finally, the cotton 
companies clearly have a strong incentive to access smallholder seed cotton production 
so as to ensure adequate throughput for their ginneries. They also have access to funds to 
finance the credit schemes. 
Using the findings from Uganda, combined with the experiences from the cotton sector in 
Zimbabwe, it is possible to assess the credit potential in other small-holder commodity 
sectors. 
Other experience of input credit schemes in Zimbabwe 
There has been much experience in Zimbabwe with input credit schemes, operated by 
both the private and public sectors. Recently attention has been given to outgrower 
schemes, particularly with high value horticultural export commodities (for example 
work by NRI/Plunkett Foundation, (Stringfellow et a/, 1997)). Outgrower schemes are an 
extension of input credit schemes. These schemes provide a more comprehensive 
approach to linking smallholders to export companies and processors. They typically 
include the provision of inputs on credit, but also a complete package of production 
services, possibly including tillage, spraying and harvesting. The smallholder provides 
land and labour in return for a full service package. In these schemes, the high cost of the 
service provided by the company involved can be justified by the high value of the final 
product. 
In Zimbabwe, a range ofhorticultural export crops are grown in outgrower schemes, 
including baby corn, flowers and mangetout beans. The care needed in producing a high 
quality product is labour-intensive, and the export companies began supplementing their 
supplies from small-holders because the large farms could not supply a quality product in 
sufficient volumes. On the large farms these crops would be grown under irrigation, but 
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on the small plots managed by the communal farmers it is possible to grow them with 
'bucket irrigation'. 
Non-irrigated Small-holder crops 
Maize 
Maize is the staple food crop in Zimbabwe, and it is grown by virtually all smallholders, 
both for household consumption and domestic marketing. There has been experience of 
input credit for maize. A German-funded irrigation scheme included a maize component 
(along with citrus and horticultural products). Inputs, including ploughing, were provided 
by the management company ofthe irrigation scheme. Marketing companies were 
identified for the different crops (The Grain Marketing Board for maize) and loans for 
inputs were intended to be recovered at the point of sale. Although there was some 
success with the horticultural products, the maize scheme had very poor results, and a 
recovery rate of less than 20%. This was attributed to maize being consumed in the 
household or traded locally, and general poor crop management by the small-holders. 
Despite the poor experiences with maize, the Gl\ffi is currently planning to introduce a 
input credit scheme for maize based on the Cottco scheme. The Government is trying to 
boost maize production to reduce the dependence on imported maize. The potential 
problems of the maize scheme are: 
1. diversion of crop to household consumption or local marketing 
2. state control of maize prices may dissuade private companies from entering the maize 
market. 
The alternative uses for maize (household consumption and local marketing) may make it 
difficult to operate an input credit scheme. Very close monitoring ofthe producers would 
be required and a variety of mechanisms for ensuring repayment. The cost of operating 
such a scheme is likely to be high, and very possibly uneconomic (given the low price for 
maize flour and the availability of alternative sources of maize from regional markets). 
Soya bean 
This is being promoted as a potential small-holder crop, though currently it is grown 
almost exclusively in the commercial sector. The interest in soyabean is party due to high 
prices being paid, and partly due to the suitability of soils in some parts of the country: 
Magumje and Guriuve areas have medium to heavy soils, suited to soyabean cultivation. 
In the commercial sector, high yields are achieved with irrigated production systems. 
The main buyers of soyabean are Olivine and National Foods. Neither company have 
expressed an interest in input credit schemes for soyabean. The main reason for this is 
that they can satisfy their requirements from the commercial sector. Ifthe incentive were 
there, for instance if commercial production dropped as happened in the cotton sector, 
then the companies may have to reconsider. fu this event, there might be potential for 
input credit- particularly as there is no tradition of growing soyabean is for household 
consumption in Zimbabwe. 
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Groundnut: 
Reapers, a private shelling plant, has recently launched an input credit scheme for 
groundnuts. For the past three years it has been providing seed on credit to small-holders. 
It also provides extension services for its growers. Currently, there are 4,000 to 5,000 
small-holders in the scheme. These are formed into groups of 100 or more. The chairmen 
of these groups have an important role, organising their members for meetings with the 
company, and the distribution of planting seed and collection of the groundnuts. Reapers 
employs around 20 extension workers to operate the scheme in the field. Agritex also 
provides support and extension advice. Compared to the input credit schemes ofthe 
cotton companies, the Reapers system is relatively simple. It claims to have a high 
repayment rate, which they put down to a culture of loyalty between the company and the 
small-holders on the scheme. 
The Oilseeds Council of Zimbabwe regard groundnuts as having considerable potential 
as a cash crop for small-holders, more so than other edible oil crops. Reasons given for 
this were: 
• it is already established as a smallholder crop 
• it is a rain-fed crop 
• farmers can use their own open-pollinated seed (though Reapers distribute seed ofthe 
variety it wishes to process) 
• it requires little attention (for instance as compared to cotton which may require 
weeding four times per season) 
• it is drought tolerant so even in bad years there will be a harvest 
• it can be used as a food crop, and 
• the purchased input requirements are relatively low. 
The potential to use groundnuts as a food crop diminishes its suitability as a commodity 
for input credit schemes. However, despite this problem, the experience of Reapers has 
been positive. 
Red sorghum 
This is a crop that is used by the local beer brewing industry. Chibuku Breweries is the 
only brewery producing this beer, which is sold only to the domestic market. Half ofthe 
red sorghum (approximately 10,000 tonnes out of a total of20,000) is purchased from 
communal farmers. An input credit scheme used to operate, though this has been 
discontinued. Seed for the sorghum is distributed at the company depots. The company 
does not see the need for an input scheme: the use of agro-chemicals for the cultivation of 
sorghum is relatively light, and farmers are able to make cash purchases of planting seed. 
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Input supply 
Review of the non-irrigated small-holder crops suggests that the more widespread 
application of input credit schemes may be limited, or at least problematic as in the case 
of maize. However, the need for inputs in small-holder production is significant, and 
access to inputs is a critical factor for increasing small-holder productivity. 
The experiences of the cotton sector demonstrate that even though input credit schemes 
are available, the majority of small-holders (around 70 percent) purchase inputs with cash 
from retailers or cotton companies. Access to inputs depends on farmers having the 
means (cash or credit) to obtain the input, and secondly, that the inputs are available. The 
further the distance that a farmer has to travel to obtain inputs, the higher the cost. The 
supply of inputs to small-holders appears fairly competitive. For instance, both ZFC and 
Windmill (both fertilizer distributors) have produced cotton packs- packages of 
necessary inputs in relatively small quantities targeted specifically at small-holders. 
CARE Agent Programme 
CARE has launched a programme aimed at increasing the availability of inputs at the 
local level. It is a credit programme targeted at local input suppliers (agents), typically 
small-scale village level retailers. These agents are identified, initially by nomination 
from the communities themselves, and candidates are reviewed by local government 
agencies (e.g. Agritex). Training is provided to selected agents in input handling, 
marketing, finance, book-keeping. The trained agents then make input orders to CARE 
which negotiates prices and terms with regional suppliers. Agents are allowed an 
inventory of up to Z$30,000. CARE consolidates the orders and arranges bulk purchases 
and delivery of the inputs. CARE bears the risk for 30-60 day credits provided to the 
agents, who repay CARE as they sell the inputs to farmers. Continual monitoring of 
stocks is carried out. The hope is that after two years of good performance, agents will be 
able to graduate and deal directly with the suppliers. 
Current performance of the programme is very encouraging. In its first year (1996/97) 
about Z$4 million worth of inputs were sold to farmers. 95 percent of payments have 
been made on time. Although CARE were unable to provide estimates of the number of 
small-holders who have benefited from the programme, it is likely that it is significant. 
Several benefits accrue to small-holders: inputs are now cheaper to purchase, partly due 
to lower transportation costs and partly due to the bulk purchases made by CARE; and 
agents advise on the appropriate choice and use of inputs. 
Agricura 
Agricura is a private company producing and distributing agro-chemicals, primarily 
pesticides. Agricura recognises the demand from smallholders and has tailored its 
operations to cater to their needs. A fairly sophisticated programme has been developed 
to reach smallholders. Twenty-three depots are located around the country, and at each 
are based a number of Agricura representatives. Each of these representatives manages a 
number of coordinators ('runners') who are responsible for mobilising smallholders into 
groups. Agricura recognises that dealing directly with individual smallholders is too 
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costly, considering the small quantities of agro-chemicals demanded. The runners take 
orders and organise group field days, when the representative will deliver the products. 
The representatives have some knowledge concerning the use ofthe chemicals and 
provide extension advice. Runners get paid on a commission basis. The pesticides are 
packaged in small quantities to suit smallholders. 
In addition to this operation, Agricura also supplies Cottco, which tenders each year for 
the supply of pesticides. Competition for this large tender is intense. 
CONCLUSIONS 
• In the absence of alternative sources of agricultural services, the role played by the 
cotton companies in increasing access to inputs is significant, especially the input 
credit scheme of Cottco. Cottco is the largest single source of credit for small-holders 
in Zimbabwe, even though it is not a financial institution. It has developed its own 
methodology for lending (from which MFis could learn), but it could also benefit 
from experiences of micro-finance institutions in Zimbabwe and internationally (for 
example in the development of appropriate software to manage the scheme as it 
becomes increasingly sophisticated). Cottco has recently started to provide cash loans 
to individuals, and this too makes it more akin with a micro-finance institution. 
• In other sectors, theoretically there is potential for both input suppliers and output 
purchasers to be involved in input credit schemes. There are difficulties: unless input 
supply is explicitly linked to output marketing, recovery may be difficult. Input 
companies have therefore focussed their credit scheme efforts at the retailer/agent 
level (see CARE programme above). Alternatively, input suppliers have sought to 
increase the availability of inputs to small-holders (see Agricura above). Output 
buyers (processors, exporters) have been more reluctant to be involved with credit 
schemes. The situation in Zimbabwe, with a sizeable large-scale commercial farming 
sector, means that only in certain commodity sectors (such as cotton) is there any 
dependence on small-holder production, and therefore there is little incentive to 
launch input credit schemes tailored to this 'market'. None of the large agro-
processors (Olivine, National Foods) have a need to embark on input credit schemes 
as they can access all their raw material from the commercial farming sector. 
• Financial discipline appears to be strengthening in Zimbabwe, and has certainly 
improved much over the past decade, as demonstrated by the improvement in 
performance of the AFC and Cottco schemes. Good financial discipline significantly 
increases the chances of success of operating input credit schemes, and even raises 
the possibility of transferring the approach to commodities where side-marketing or 
household consumption is a real possibility (such as food crops). 
• Despite the success and apparent sustainability ofthe cotton input credit schemes, 
they nonetheless depend to some extent on funds available on concessionary terms. It 
is not clear whether they could be operated at higher interest rates, but it must be 
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assumed that the take-up would be less. The present macro-economic situation also 
gives rise to concern. High inflation is not conducive to the operation of credit 
schemes, and savings rates are currently negative (in real terms). High interest rates 
dissuade small-holders from taking credit; investment in assets is seen as a better 
option. Purchasing inputs at the time of sale of seed cotton may become more 
popular, though storage of inputs may pose some problems (space, handling, and 
health risks). It might be possible for the cotton companies to store inputs for small-
holders, but this would add to costs and farmers may be reluctant to make advance 
purchases if they do not take possession of the input at the same time. 
• The role of groups is very significant in Zimbabwe, and a key determinant of success 
for the cotton input credit schemes. 
• Despite the success ofthe cotton company schemes in increasing access to inputs, it 
is clear that credit is only part of the solution to increasing input use. The availability 
of inputs in rural areas is equally important. Many smallholders in Zimbabwe appear 
to have the capacity to purchase inputs without credit. 
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ANNEX I: Contact list: 
MrS. G. Kwaramba 
Mr. Langton Mukwereza 
Mr. Ken Wilson 
Mr. Steven Chipika 
Mr. John Lwande 
Mr. Rob Jarvis 
Mr. Joseph Zizhou 
Mr. Phillippe Lehrmann 
Mr. Barry Fisher 
Mr. Taswell Chivere 
Mr. Thomas Yuba 
Mr. George Hutchenson 
Ms. Chinindi Tsitsi 
Mr. Cuthbert Chamboko 
Mr. Kidia 
Mr. Borerwe 
Ms. Trinity Mafu 
Mr. Alain Kerrec 
Mr. S. T. Heri 
Mr. Oscar Chimanzi 
Mr. John Hansell 
Mr. Roland Murengwa 
Mr. Sylvester Tsikisayi 
Mr. Kamba 
Mr. D. Mfote 
Mr. Cuthbert Chakunyuka 
Mr. Nicholas Chakwera 
Ms. Nan Chalmers 
Mr. Brian Schlacter 
Ms. Joanne Mhunduru 
Mr Isiah Nyamadzawo 
Mr. Felix Katsande 
Mr. John Chimukoko 
Mr. Abel Chiwara 
Sales Manager, Zimbabwe Fertiliser Company 
Chief Agriculture Specialist, Agritex 
Managing Director, Agricura 
Technology Policy Adviser, Intermediate Technology 
Development Group (ITDG) 
CARE Zimbabwe 
General Manager- Seed Division, Cottco 
Loans and extension officer, Bindura cotton depot, Cottco 
Managing Director, Cargill Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd 
ChiefExecutive, Cotpro Ltd 
Inputs Manager, Cottco 
Horticultural Promotion Council 
Oilseeds Council 
Reapers (groundnut processors) 
Silveira House 
Financial Director, Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd 
National Breweries Ltd 
Production Manager, United Refineries Ltd 
EU Structural Adjustment Support Programme & ST ABEX 
Chief Executive, Horticultural Promotion Council 
Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
Department for International Development, Harare 
Chibuku Breweries 
Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
Marketing Manager, Grain Marketing Board 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Operations Director, Cottco 
Senior Technical Services Officer, Agricultural Finance 
Corporation 
Zeneca 
Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd 
NRI Crop Post Harvest Research Programme coordinator 
Haramba farmers group leader, Cottco input credit scheme, 
Bindura district 
Cotton farmer, Chevakadzi 
Cotton farmer, Madziwa 
Cotton farmer, Madziwa 
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ANNEX I! 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
Cotton sector 
1. Document the process which has taken place with the provision of cotton sector credit 
(starting with the parastatal operation without a credit programme, the introduction of 
scheme, liberalisation of the sector with entry of competitors, and resulting pressure 
on and adaptation ofthe scheme). 
2. Document the current situation with access to credit for cotton small-holders? Who 
provides it? Scale (no of farmers, type of farmer)? Repayment and sustainability? 
Are there problems? - how are these being addressed? 
3. How do the various parties involved see the present and future role of credit schemes 
(3 cotton companies, farmers, other stakeholders)? 
4. What lessons can be learned for cotton and for other sectors? 
Other sectors 
6. Identify other sectors with input credit potential, based on the results of field work in 
Zimbabwe and Uganda. 
Workshop preparation 
7. Provisionally identify key people able to contribute different perspectives and 
experience to a constructive debate at the proposed March workshop. 
8. Give consideration to possible venues, cost and logistical arrangements for the 
organisation of a 1-2 day workshop. 
Miscellaneous 
9. Meet with John Hansell (DFID NR adviser Harare) to briefhim on the project. 
Reporting 
10. The report should cover the three main areas highlighted above -and the first two to 
form the basis of discussion papers for the workshop. 
22 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Goodland, A. (1999) Smallholder credit in Uganda: roles of farmers, government and 
the private sector. Natural Resources Institute 
Gordon, A. (1997) Strengthening Research Linkages with Agricultural Markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Zimbabwe Case Study. ISNAR Discussion Paper No. 97-2 
Mudhara, M., Anandajayasekeram, P., Kupfuma, B. and Mazhangara, E. (1995) 
Impact assessment of cotton research and the enabling environment in Zimbabwe, 1970-
1995. Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research 
Policy and Planning Division, Ministry of Lands and Agriculture (1998) The 
Agricultural Sector ofZimbabwe: Statistical Bulletin, March 1998. Government of 
Zimbabwe. 
Rukovo, A., Chirisa, A., Munzara, A. and Vudzijani, V. (1998) Status ofruralfinance 
in Zimbabwe Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, Harare. Draft Report. 
Stringfellow, R., Coulter, J., Lucey, T., McKone, C. and Hussein, A. (1997) 
Improving the access of smallholders to agricultural services in sub-Saharan Africa: 
farmer cooperation and the role of the donor community. OD! Natural Resource 
Perspectives Number 20. 
23 
